Stefano Vannucci
DEPS, Università di Siena
Abstract
An evolutionary game is a game endowed with a population of agents for each player role, a probability matching space and - possibly - an explicit evolutionary dynamics, on a state space that is defi ned by means of some parameters of the game. Evolutionary games are an essential tool in modeling several issues related to the evolution of cooperation. In particular, by varying appropriately the underlying basic game and its dynamics, evolutionary games can be deployed to provide a neat representation of distinct versions of the evolution of cooperation- problem, including the evolution of altruism, the evolution of distribution conventions, and the evolution of common-interest coordination. It is argued that, according to a plausible formulation of 'historical materialism' , the latter essentially amounts to the thesis that in games with common interest the evolution of the common interest equilibrium is typically to be expected even when it is risk-dominated.
Jel Codes
C70, C73
